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92 PALMQUIST v. MERCER [43 0.2d 
rL. A. ~o. 22604. In Bank. June 25, 1954.] 
IUOHARD L. PAI1MQUIST, Appellant, v. H. W. MERCER 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Dismissal-Nonsuit-When Motion Granted.---A motion for 
nonsuit may properly !J,, granted only when, disregarding con-
flirting evidence and giving plaintiff's evidence all the value 
to which it is legally entitled, indulging in every lPgitimate 
inference which may be drawn therefrom, the result is a de-
termination that there is no evidence of sufficient substan-
tiality to support a verdict for plaintiff. 
[2] Trial-Questions for Court and Jury.--Trial court is not justi-
fied in taking ease from jury unless it can be said as a matter 
of law that no other reasonable conclusion is legally deducible 
from the evidence and that any other holding would be so 
lacking in evidentiary support that reviewing court would be 
impelled to reverse it on appeal or trial court to set it aside as 
a matter of law. 
[3] Contracts-Acceptance of Instrument in Ignorance of Con-
tents.-Generally, when a person with capacity of reading and 
understanding an instrument signs it, he is, in absence of fraud 
and imposition, bound hy its contents, and is estopped from 
saying that its provisions are contrary to his intentions or 
understanding. 
[ 4] Animals-Injuries by Animals-Liability of Keeper.-In ab-
sence of any notice to contrary, contract of hiring of horse 
for riding purposes contains implied warranty to rider that 
stablckeeper knows or has exercised reasonable care to ascer-
tain habits of horse and that animal is safe and suitable to ride. 
[5] !d.-Injuries by Animals-Liability of Keeper.-It is duty of 
stahlekeeper to inform himself of habits and disposition of 
horses which he keeps in his stable for hire, and if he knows 
that they are dangerous or unsuitable, or by exercise of reason-
able care could ascertain the fact, he is liable for any injuries 
to a customer resulting from their vicious propensities. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 48; 
Am.Jur., Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 42. 
[B] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 61; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 137. 
[4] Liability of owner or bailor of horse for injuries by horse 
to hirer or bailee thereof, note, 15 A.L.R.2d 1313. See, also, Cal. 
Jur.2d, Animals, § 61 et seq.; Am.Jur., Animals, § 42 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Dismissal,§ 75; [2] Trial,§ 125; [3] 
Contracts, § 34; [ 4, 5] Animals, § 40; [6, 7] Animals, § 49; [8] Re-
lease, §22(2); [9] Release, §10; [10] Fraud, §§80, 91; [11] 
Nuisances, § 24; [12, 13, 15] Negligence, §§58, 69; [14] Negli-
gence, § 32. 
June 1954] PALMQUIST v. MERCER 
[43 C.2d 92; 272 P.2d 26] 
93 
[6) Id.- Injuries by Animals- Questions of Fact.-In action 
against owner of riding academy for personal injuries sus-
tained hy equestrian while riding horse which he had rented 
from academy, whether at time and place in question such 
horse was unsafe or unsuitable for purpose for which it was 
hired is a question for jury to determine where there was evi-
dence that defendant knew that horse was not tame and 
gentle but was hig·h-spirited, headstrong, difficult to control, 
had a "tough mouth" and was unsuitable for an inexperienced 
rider; where manager of academy testified that on several 
oecaBions he had told defendant these facts in reporting ac-
counts of various riders in their attempts to handle horse, and 
had also told defendant that horse was "barn sour" and that 
it should not be on rental string because it was untrustworthy; 
and where there was further evidence that on a number of 
occasions prior to plaintiff's accident, horse had bolted with 
its riders. 
[7] Id.- Injuries by Animals- Questions of Fact.-In action 
against owner of riding academy for personal injuries sus-
tained by equestrian while riding horse which he had rented 
from academy, plaintiff's contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk arc questions of fact for determination of jury 
under all the circumstances of case. 
[Sa, 8b] Release-Questions of Law and Fact.-In action against 
owner of riding aeademy for personal injuries sustained by 
equestrian while riding horse which he had rented from 
academy, whether there was fraud or misrepresentation on 
defendant's part in causing plaintiff to sign a release absolv-
ing academy from all liability when defendant knew of plain-
tiff's inexperience is a question for jury to determine where 
there was evidence that, notwithstanding fact that plaintiff 
had asked for "tame and gentle horses" for himself and his 
wife, defendant knew of the dangerous propensities of horse 
which was assigned to plaintiff. 
(9] Id.-Validity-Fraud.--Failure to disclose material facts af-
fecting essence of release agreement may constitute "actual 
fraud" vitiating contract. ( Civ. Code, § 1572.) 
[10] Fraud- Questions of Fact: Evidence- Circumstantial Evi-
dence.-Actual fraud is a question of fact ( Civ. CodP, § 1574), 
and may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
[11] Nuisances- What Are Nuisances.--A pipe line trestle con-
structed by an oil company on property controlled by a flood 
eontrol district, with permission of district and not on a public 
street or highway, could not be characterized as a nuisance. 
[12] Negligence-Care by Owners or Occupants of Realty-Duty 
Towards Trespassers and Licensees.-Status of oil eompany 
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maintaining a pipe line trestle on n"'''"'''''t·v 
control district with express l'"'ruu;:,;,wu 
that of legal possessor of property, or 
obligation than landowner with 
erty in relation to person on 
trespasser or licensee, and whether an 
property be viewed as a 
owes him only duty of from 
jury, and hence may not be held liable 
by equestrian who was struck 
beneath trestle when horse ran under trestle. 
[13] Id.-Care by Owners or Occupants of "·"''''r·'"-
Trespassers and Licensees.-The fact that 
on property controlled by flood control district on which oil 
company maintained a pipe line under trestle 
at suggestion of attendant of riding from which he 
rented horse or erroneously assumed that he was 
public road in proceeding under trestle where he 
and injured by stationary object 
would not alter his status as or licensee or 
rules governing duty owed by oil company to 
respect to condition of premises. 
[14] !d.-Assumption of Risk.-An equestrian who was 
while passing under a pipe line trestle maintained by oil com-
pany on property controlled by a flood control district was 
obliged to take premises as he found them insofar as any de-
fective condition thereon might exist. 
[15] !d.-Care by Owners or Occupants of Realty-Duty Towards 
Trespassers and Licensees.-An oil company which was 
permission by another oil company maintaining a 
trestle on property controlled by flood control district to 
and maintain a pipe line on such trestle, cost of 
trestle being divided between two companies but all control 
over maintenance and repair of trestle being maintained 
company first on property, may not be held liable for 
sustained by equestrian who, having entered property as tres-
passer or licensee, was injured when horse ran under trest]P 
and he was struck by stationary object beneath 
trestle. 
APPEAL from a judgment o£ the Court of Los 
Angeles County. Joseph M. Maltby, Judge. Affirmed iu 
part and reversed in part. 
Action for damages for personal and for breach 
of warranty. Judgment of nonsuit reversed as to defendant 
Mercer and affirmed as to defendants Union Oil and 
'l'ide Water Associated Oil 
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and Eric A. Rose for 
lVIcGee and Richard E. Reese 
Clarence S. Hunt for Respondent 
A. :Wloss and Henry F. Walker 
Associated Oil Company. 
damages for personal in-
a horse which he had 
the close of plaintiif's 
defendants' motions for nonsuit, and 
from the judgment subsequently entered. 
of the we have concluded that 
was sufficient to require submission of 
as to defendant Mercer, who was the 
of the academy, but that the nonsuit was properly 
to the other defendants. 
A motion for nonsuit may properly be granted " ... 
and when, disregarding conflicting evidence, and 
to plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is 
in every legitimate inference 
may be drawn from that evidence, the result is a de-
i enninalion tlmt there is llO evidence of sufficient substan-
to a verdict in :favor of the plaintiff." (Card 
210 Cal. 200, 202 [291 P. 190]; see also Blumberg 
& 1'. B4 Cal.2d 226, 229 [209 P.2d 1]; Golceff v. 
36 Cal.2d 153 l222 P.2d 665] .) [2] "Unless 
be said a matter of law, that ... no other reasonable 
deducible from the evidence, and that 
·would be so lacking in evidentiary support 
eourt would be impelled to reverse it upon 
or the trial court to set it aside as a matter of law, 
1 he trial conrt is not justified in taking the ease from the 
" (Estate 216 Cal. 397, 400 [14 P.2d 768]; 
also Raber v. 36 Ca1.2d 654, 656 [226 P.2d 574].) 
On Oetober 1950, plaintiff and his wife visited de-
~\Iereer 's academy at 223cl Street and Golden 
;\venue h1 the of Long Beach. Plaintiff told the attendant 
1rould like to rent two horses and asked for ''a 
of old nags.'' He explained that he had not been on 
96 PALMQUIST v. MERCER [43 C.2d 
a horse in six or seven years, that his companion had never 
previously ridden at any time, and that they would like "tame 
and gentle horses." The attendant said that he would "fix 
them up'' and asked plaintiff to come into the office. Plain-
tiff there signed the register pad, as requested, and then 
followed the attendant out of the room. He was in the office 
approximately fifteen seconds. He did not read the paper that 
he signed, a printed form which was introduced at the trial 
as Exhibit D and which contained a general release of thP 
academy from any liability. Plaintiff was not requested to 
read the form nor were its provisions called to his attention, 
but neither was he prevented from reading it. 
After again discussing plaintiff's need for ''gentle'' horses, 
the attendant chose a horse named ''Doc'' for plaintiff and 
another horse for plaintiff's wife. At the time plaintiff 
mounted ''Doc,'' the horse was feeding at a trough. 'When 
plaintiff tried to get the horse to move away, it refused to 
respond to his reining, and it was necessary for the attendant 
to lead the horse from the trough. The attendant told plain-
tiff to go north on Golden A venue, west on 223d Street, and 
then north again under a pipe trestle. The horses proceeded 
out of the driveway and at Golden and 223d Street, the horses, 
of their own accord, turned east. After going some thirty 
feet, plaintiff and his wife succeeded in turning the horses 
west. They continued a short distance, when the horses, 
again of their own accord, turned into a stable, walked to a 
water trough, began drinking, and for a time could not be 
guided away as plaintiff pulled on the left rein. Finally, the 
horses, plaintiff's mount in the lead, left the trough of their 
own volation and retraced the way to the riding academy. 
Plaintiff told the attendant that they were having trouble 
managing their horses. Upon reassuring them that "there 
was nothing vvrong with the horses,'' the attendant gave a 
demonstration of how to direet the horses by use of the 
reins. He then accompanied them back to the intersection 
of Golden and 223d Street, and then west on 223d Street 
until they were opposite a pipe line trestle located on the 
north side of the street. There was a road going ·west under 
the trestle and then making a bend and proceeding in a 
northerly direction. The attendant told them to bend over 
going under the trestle and then to ride as far as they liked. 
The trestle traverses the Los Angeles River in an east-
west direction and carries oil pipe lines of defendants Union 
Oil Company of California and Tide Water Associated Oil 
June 1954] PALMQUIST v. MERCER 
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It was built and maintained with permission from 
the Los Angeles Plood Control District, on public property 
under the control of the district. 
Plaintiff and his wife rode under the trestle along the in-
cHeated road, with plaintiff's horse in the lead. After pro-
ceeding about 400 feet to the north at a walk, plaintiff turned 
his head to the left and called to his wife. As he made this 
movement, plaintiff's horse suddenly reeled about to the left 
and began racing back on the road toward the trestle, gaining 
speed as it went. Plaintiff attempted in vain to control or 
stop the horse by pulling back on the reins as hard as he could 
with both hands, but the horse kept going faster, passed 
plaintiff's wife and ran around the bend in the road towards 
the trestle. Immediately before the accident and at a dis-
tance of some 8 to 10 feet from the trestle, plaintiff noticed 
some underhanging beams stretching over the traveled area at 
a height of about 6 feet. Plaintiff was then lying flat in 
the saddle, with his head held down as far to the right as he 
conld get it and his left shoulder pointing upwards. His left 
shoulder and neck hit a stationary object such as the under-
structure of the pipe trestle, and plaintiff blacked out. When 
he regained consciousness he was lying immediately to the 
south of the pipe trestle, approximately 5 feet from the 
nearest substructure of the trestle and immediately south of 
the traveled area under the trestle. As a result of the acci-
dent, plaintiff is permanently paralyzed from the waist down. 
Plaintiff, who was 21 years of age when the accident oc-
curred, sought damages from defendants Mercer, owner of the 
riding academy and stables; the Union Oil Company, owner 
of the trestle; and 'l'ide Water Associated Oil Company, which 
maintained a pipe line upon the trestle. Plaintiff's complaint 
rests on two theories of recovery : breach of warranty and 
negligence. The breach of warranty cause of action is 
directed only against defendant Mercer and is based on the 
alleged unsuitability of the horse rented to plaintiff in view 
of plaintiff's disclosed inexperience in riding. The negligence 
cause of action is directed against all three defendants: against 
JV[ercer in assigning to plaintiff a horse allegedly known to be 
both dangerous and unmanageable, and in telling plaintiff to 
ride along what appeared to be a public road whereon a 
hazardous condition existed, and against the two oil companies 
in maintaining a hazardous condition, the trestle, without 
providing reasonably effective safeguards. By separate 

























constituted a bar to 
of law; and the oil 
eiency of the evidenee to 
the time of the horses. It 
''fully and forever release 
Riding Aeadem~· awl the 
elaims, demands, damages, 
on aecount of either Jmo\Yn or 
external or internal, personal, 
eauses, or oihervvise, or 
and character 
during the rental 
indirectly. . . . I 
and assume fuU 
or that may occur b:-~ rrnson 
rental charges on demand.'' 
prevented from the 
not would be immaterial. [3] 
dental & Oriental 
471 [34 P. 
the capacity 
signs it, he 
by its 
coueea1ed or hidden, 
damages or 
or in.inries of every kind 
wl1ich nm_,. resnlt from or 
either directly or 
at my own risk 
from 
tl!Preo1' and :wree to pay the 
1vas not 
and whether be did or 
viSions arc to his intentions 
(See also Nichols v. Hitchcock JJfofor 
151, 153 et seq. P.2C! 
Plaintiff' maintains that of the 
release should have been snhmittPd to the a" a faetnal 
issue to be determined in the of the eircumstances sur-
rounding its execution. His recovery Mercer 
sustains his position. 
99 
horse for riding pur-
the there is 
rider that the stable-
reasonable (~are to ascertain 
the animal is safe and 
hires the horse 
52 Cal.App.2d 1, 
of a stablckeeper to 
of the horses 
and if he knows that 
or the exercise of reason-
he is liable for any injuries 
their vicious propensities. (Dam 
6 Cal.2d 395, 399-400 [57 P.2d 
104 Cal.App.2d 317, 320 
224 Pa. l 54 [73 A. 324, 
Ann.Cas. 504, 25 L.R.A.N.S. 
horse '' was not ''tame and 
difficult to control, 
'' and was not suitable for an inexperi-
enced rider. 'l'he manager of the academy at the time "Doc" 
and until the following Sep-
seYeral occasions during that period 
he had told lVIercer these facts in reporting the accounts of 
Yarious riders in their to handle ''Doc'' ; that he 
harl also told Mercer that "Doc" was "barn sour" (i.e. dis-
liked the stable and when away, had a tendency to 
return quickly of his own and he had advised lVIercer 
to get rid of the that "Doc" should not be on the 
rental There was 
fnrfher evidence that on a number of occasions prior to plain-
tiff's acc-ident "Doc" had bolted with 
whether 
nnsafe 
lJ i!'ed would he for the 
determination of the 
that she suffered severe in-
thrown from the saddle and 
testifying that she had 
the horse under control. 
incidents to the manager 
ulLt"c<tu~'"'"' the matter of 
uG~•uu·u the horse "Doc" 
for which he was 
to determine. [7] I.Jikewise for 
of fact under all the cir-
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cumstances were the matters of plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk. (Kersten v. Young, supra, 52 
Cal.App.2d 1, 8.) 
[8a] Plaintiff properly maintains that the evidence pre-
sents the further issue of whether there was fraud or mis-
representation on the part of Mercer in causing plaintiff to 
sign a release absolving the academy from all liability when 
Mercer knew of plaintiff's inexperience-as plaintiff had so 
advised the attendant at the academy in asking for "tame 
and gentle horses'' ( Clowdis v. Fresno Plume etc. Co., 118 
Cal. 315, 321 [50 P. 373, 62 Am.St.Rep. 238] )-and of the 
dangerous propensities of the horse ''Doc,'' which neverthe-
less was assigned to plaintifl'. "All contracts which have 
for their object, directly or illdirecily, to exempt anyone from 
responsibility for his own fraud ... are against the policy 
of the law." ( Ci v. Code, § 1668.) [9] The failure to di"-
close material facts affecting the essence of the agreemeni 
may constitute "actual fraud," vitiating the contract. ( Civ. 
Code, § 1572; see Rest., Contracts, § 471.) Mercer unavail-
ingly argues that the release signed by plaintiff is binding 
as a matter of law under the decision in Werner- v. Knoll, 
89 Cal.App.2d 474 [201 P.2d 45], recognizing that "contracts 
seeking to relieve individuals from the results of their own 
negligence are not inYalid as against the policy of the law." 
(P. 476.) 'rhe record there presented no question as to the 
effectiYeness of a release purporting to exempt one from lia-
bility "for his own fraud." (P. 477.) [10] Actual fraud 
is a question of fact ( Civ. Code, § 157 4) ; and like any other 
fact, it may be proyed by circumstantial evidence. ( 12 Cal. 
.T ur., § 78, p. 829.) [8b] The record here contains ample 
evidence to sustain a finding of fraud on the part of defendant 
Mercer, and the trial court erred in withdrawing that issue 
from the jury. (See Wilson v. San Francisco-Oakland T. 
Rys., 48 Cal.App. 343, 349-350 [191 P. 975].) 
However, there is no evidence which would sustain plain-
tiff's claim against the two defendant oil companies, and 
the nonsuits were properly granted as to them. Plaintiff 
argues these theories of liability on this phase of the ease : 
that the place of the accident was a public roadway and the 
trestle maintained thereon by the oil companies constituted 
a public nuisance; but in any event, they were chargeable 
with the consequences of any injuries allegedly eansed by 
their negligent maintenance of the trestle. 
Plaintiff concedes that the accident occurred on property 
controlled by the Los Angeles Flood Control District. The 
June PALMQUIST v. MERCER 
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was constructed in 1922 by defendant Union Oil Com-
pany pursuant to permission of the flood control district. 
A variance in construction from the plans originally approved 
the district resulted in an overhang of some 2 feet 41/2 
inches lower than authorized. This was known to the dis-
trict and apparently the trestle had been accepted as con-
structed. 'rhus during the following years and prior to the 
date of the accident (October 10, 1950), Union Oil Company 
had from time to time notified the district of the necessity 
of repairing the trestle and had so proeeeded npon receiving 
permission from the district contingent upon the work not 
changing the then existing clearance so as to impede or 
obstruct the run-off of flood waters. Por some 12 years or 
more preceding plaintiff's accident, people had indiscrimi-
nately entered the general area of the flood control channel, 
riding about on horseback crossing underneath the trestle 
at various points, and there was a well-defined path at the 
place \Yhere the aecident happened. Other aceidents had 
occurred there and the l:'nion Oil Compan;' hnf1 know1edg·e 
thereof. In fact, in 1941, upon being notified of one such 
incident, it had posted signs on the trestle: "\Yarning to 
Horseback Riders, r~ow Clearance." 
[11] Plaintiff argues that the trestle obstrueted the pub-
lie's "free passage or use, in the customary manner," of 
the crossing beneath anil therefore constituted a "public 
nnisaner." Hut it im1iRputably appears that the trestle was 
not on a pu blie street or high·war, as required by the statu-
tory srctions rited by plaintiff. (Civ. Code, §§ 3479-3480.) 
The trestle thrrefore could not be eharactrrized as a nuisance. 
(Barrett v. Smdhern Pac. Co., 207 Cal. 154, 160 [277 P. 
481]; Gerberich v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 5 Cal.2d 
46, 50 [fl3 P.2d 948] .) 
[12] Nor does it appear that Union Oil Company breached 
any duty owing to plaintiff by reason of its maintenance of 
the trestle. In Pxercising its right to maintain the trestle, 
Fnion Oil Company was acting by rxpress permission of 
the flood control distriet, like thr hol(1er of a franchise. (See 
City of Oakland v. Hogan, 41 CaU\pp.2d 333. 346-347 [106 
P.2d 987] .) As sueh, its status was akin to that of the leg'al 
rossessor of property, having no greater duty or obligation 
than the landowner with respect to the condition of the 
property in relation to a person coming on the property 
<'ither as a trespasser or licensee. (Lindholm v. Northwestern 
Pac. R. Co., 79 Cal.App. 34, 40 [248 P. 1033] ; 65 C.J.S. 
tinger v 
156 A.L.IL 1221 
[136 P.2d 
the property iu q ues< 
of tl1e 
17G CaL 
v. Raymond, 197 CaL 
contrary to the that 
proceeding under the trestle 
15 Cal.App.2d 44G, 449 [ 5D P 
Attwood Rock 70 Cal 
would not alter his status 
the duty owed Uniol! Oil 
to the condition of the 
take the premises as he fonnd thrm 
defective condition thereon 
art, supra, 24 Cal.2d 
Plaintiff relies upon mnnerous eases in 
that since the Union Oil had 
accidents in the general area 1vhere 
was obligated to correct any 
tion there existing. 
not in point, for in the main 
tions in structures over or on 
(E.g., Shea v. City San 
P.2d 365] ; Sandstoe v. Atch1:son T. & R. P. 
App.2d 215 [82 P.2d 216] : Gibson 
681 [216 P.2d ; Postal 
Ky. 576 [189 S.\Y. 
Plaintiff argues the further 
maintenance of the trestlr 
decide, citing Dovoust v. 
P. 760, 9 ~Ann.Cas. 847. 7 
Pacific Power 107 Cal. 
156]. Both cases are 
In the Davonst case 
path across a vacant lot, was 
with a live wire from an electric 
a trespasser on the property. 'rhere was no discussion of 
liability between the had defendant been using the 
103 
In the Davis case 
uv•oc•va of whether 
shaft which caused 
the lessee, the ad-
on the premises. The 
awarded damages to 
defendant had no such 
there was chargeable 
of the dangerous 
Prosser 
on Torts l with in Oettinger v. 
supra. 24 Cal.2d 133, 138.) Here defendant Union 
constructed and maintained the trestle under 
of the flood eontrol distriet, and there was 
whatever of any active negligence on its part. 
of above discussed, it owed no 
duty to 
the property, with respect to 
Accordingly, the nonsuit was 
Union Oil 
did the the owner of 
the condition of the premises. 
as to defendant 
[15] fnrnishes no support to plain-
tiff's elaim of defendant Tide \Vater Associ-
ated Oil Company. T n 19:-~6 Union Oil Company gave Tide 
\Vater Associated permission to plaee and maintain one pipe 
line upon the trestle. Under their agreement, cost of main-
tailling the trestle \YilS divir1ed between the hvo oil companies, 
but a1l control o-rer operation and repair of 
the trestle was retained Pnion Oil Company. In view of 
our conelusion that tl1e evidcnre was insnfficient to impose 
liability upon clefrndant Union Oil Company, it necessarily 
follows that sueh evidenc~e was likevrise insufficient to impose 
liability npon defendant Tide \Vater Associated Oil Company. 
The judgment of nonsuit is reversed as to defendant Mer-
cer but affirmed as to defendants Union Oil Company and 




Traynor, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, ,J .-I concur in the judgment of reversal. How-
ever, the rule to gratuitous licenses should not 
be as stated in the 
"Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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It is not law nor in keeping with the modern trend 
of decisions, to say, as does the majority, that the owner 
of property is liable only for wanton and wilful conduct as 
to gratuitous licensees (persons who are on the property with 
implied or express consent of the owner but not as business 
visitors in whose presence he has an economic interest) with 
respect to the dangerous condition of his property as dis-
tinguished from activity thereon by him, even though he 
had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. Where 
an owner has actual knowledge of a dangerous condition on 
his property, his duty should be ordinary care toward gra-
tuitous licensees and he would have to at least warn of the 
danger. Such licensee would still be in a category different 
from a business visitor, because as to the latter, the owner 
must not only guard against known dangers but also those 
which would have been revealed by reasonable inspection, 
that is, those he should have known of in the exercise of ordi-
nary care. This is the rule in the Restatement. ''A possessor 
of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to 
gratuitous licensees by a natural or artificial condition thereon 
if, but only if, he 
"(a) knows of the condition and realizes that it involves 
an unreasonable risk to them and has reason to believe that 
they will not discover the condition or realize the risk, and 
"(b) invites or permits them to enter or remain npon the 
land, without exercising reasonable care 
"(i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or 
"(ii) to warn them of the condition and the risk involved 
therein." (Rest. Torts, § 342.) 
Also, our statutes read : "Everyone is responsible, not 
only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury 
occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill 
in the management of his property or person. except so far 
as the latter has, willfu11:v or by IYant of ordinary care. 
brought the injnry upon himself.'' (Emphasis added; Civ. 
Corle, § 1714.) And the District Court of Appeal has said: 
''The law in reference to the duty owed to trespassers, licen-
sees and invitees has largPly developed in reference to the 
duty of an owner or occupier of real property or structures 
thereon. The statutes of this state do not provide that a 
different duty is owed to persons in the three named cate-
gories. The only relevant statute is section 1714 of the Civil 
Code, which provides : 'Everyone is responsible, not only 
for the result of his wilful acts, but also for an injury occa-
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sioned to another vmnt of ordinary care or skill in 
the of his property or person, so far 
the latter has, or by want of ordinary care, brought 
the ury upon himself.' In spite of this code section, 
whieh has been in our law unchanged since 1872, and which 
,;tates a eivil law and not a common-law (Code 
§ 1383 r~ouisiana Code ( 1808), § 2215), our courts, 
in some cases at and in apparent disregard of the sec-
have followed the common-law rule, which purports 
to make and rigid distinctions as to the duty owed 
the owner or occupier to invitees, licensees and trespassers. 
it has been stated that towards a trespasser the owner 
or occupier only owes a duty to refrain from wilful or wanton 
conduct; towards a licensee a similar duty, plus the affirmative 
to warn of unusual dangers, while towards an invitee 
there is the duty to exercise ordinary care and prudence. 
(See eases collected 13 Cal.L.Rev. 72, 73, footnotes 5, 6 and 7.) 
Sueh an approach requires a court to first determine the 
status of the visitor, which is sometimes a most 
(1iffieult task, and then to determine from the cases whether 
the owner has violated any duty mved to a member of such 
a elass. Sueh an approach is unrealistic, arbitrary, and in-
elastie. 'l'he point where the (]utieR towards members of 
PilCh of the classeR begins or ends or where it should begin 
or end, or where the dnty uot to aet beeomes supplemented 
the <luty to act, is almost imposRible of perception. It is 
ll'J wonder that exeeedingl,\' fine distinetions have been de-
ye1opec1 so that the law is most eonfnsed in this field. (See, 
13 Cal.L.Rev. 72.) lVIany eases, and particularly the 
more recent ones, have in fact applied the gt-neral doctrine 
of negligence embodied in section 1714 of the Civil Code 
rather than the eommon-law rigid eatrgories trst. (For a 
disenssion of these problems see Boucher v. American 
Bridge Co., 95 Cal. A pp.2cl 659, 667 [213 P.2d 5371. et seq.) 
''Thus, while t ht-r(' are many eases holding that a land 
owner is only required to r(,frain from inflicting wanton or 
wilful inj11ries on a trespasser or licensee (see many cases 
eollected 19 Cal.Jur. p. 616, §52, fn. 13), there are many 
r·ases also holding that after 'a trespasser is seen in a position 
of danger, (1ue care nmst be exerciser1 to ayoid injuring him, 
ana it is 11egligenee not to do so.' (19 Cal.Jur. p. 616, 
~ :l2. at p. 617; Sf't- eases eolleeted in fn. 17 on p. 618.) This 
duty of reasonable care not only extends to situations where 
rn·<•senee, but also 
to situatium; whE•re l11~ his presence. 'l'Jm:;. 
the Hestatement of 'l'or1s ( vol. 2, dedares that if the 
possessor of lalld does not know of a tn•spasser presence, 
but 'from facts known to hiw should know or believe tha1 
anotl1er is or may be' lw is ' to liability 
for harm thereafter eansed to the trespasser the 
possessor's failure to (·arry ou l1 is aeti vi ties upon the laliC! 
with reasonable care for the 's ' 
California cases are cited as in accord in the California 
anuotation to this section.) 
"l\Iany courts, in imposing this duty of reasonable care 
towards trespassers <md l icenS(ces, ha H} drawn a distinction 
between active and passiye negligeuce, and have limited the 
reasonable care test to overt aets of negligence. (See anno-
tation 49 A.L.R California has quite clearly adopted 
this distinction and imposetl a duty to exercise reasonable 
eare towards known licensees or trespassers so far as active 
operations are concerned. In the well-reasoned case of Oet-
finger v. 24 Cal.2r113:3, 188 [148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R 
1221], cases to the contrary were expressly overruled. (See 
also Herold v. P. H. Mathews Paint Ho1tse, 39 Cal.App. 489, 
493 [179 P. 414]; Barnett v. La Mesa Post No. 282, 15 Cal. 
2d 191, 194 [99 P.2d 650]; Yamauchi v. O'Neill, 38 Cal.App. 
2d 703, 708 [102 P.2d 3G5j; Harnakawa v. Crescent Wharf 
etc. Co., 4 Cal.2d 499, 503 [50 P.2d 803].) 'rhis rule imposing 
a duty to exercise reasonable care towards known trespassers 
so far as affirmative acts are concerned, is in accord with the 
modern trend of authorities." (Fernandez v. Consolidated 
Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal.App.2d 91, 95 [219 P.2d 73] .) The 
real factor is whether the person is known by the owner to 
be on the premises and in case of a licensee or even a tres-
passer, he may have that knowledge. (See Oettinger v. 
24 Cal.2d 133 [148 P.2d 19, 156 A.IJ.R. 1221].) In 
the case of licensees the landowner knows they are there 
and when he also knovvs there is a dangerous condition which 
will encounter, it is not unreasonable to impose upon 
him the of taking· some measure to protect the licensee 
tt'om the danger (see 38 Am .• Jur., Negligence, § 106) and 
that is the modern trend. (.James, Tort Liability of Occu-
piers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 
Yale L.,J. 
It is not necessary in this ease to state that a property 
owner is liable to a gratuitous licensee only for wanton or 
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[43 C2d 107; 271 P.2d 857] 
wilful conduct with reference to the condition of his 
for there are other reasons has not made a case 
'l'his court has not announced such a rule for many 
vears and Oettinger supra, 24 Ca1.2d 133, casts 
· upon it. This court should reexamine such a rule in 
with the discussion in ~Fernandez v. Consolidated Fish-
supra, 98 91. 
[L. A. No. 22972. In Bank. June 
IIARHY M. SCHWARTZ, Appellant, v. SLENDERELLA 
SYSTEMS OF CAJ_.~IFORNIA, INC. Corporation), 
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Trademarks and Trade Names-Unfair Competition-Injunc-
tive Relief.-Under Civ. Code, § 3369, since its amendment 
in 1933 ( Stats. 1933, p. 2482), either unfair or fraudulent 
business practice is sufficient to permit injunctive relief against 
unfair competition in use of a trade name; fraud on part of 
junior appropriator is no longer sole for such relief. 
[2] !d.-Unfair Competition-Evidence.-In action by retailer of 
women's apparel under trade names of "Slenderella" and 
"Slenderella of Hollywood" to enjoin operator of redueing 
salons from using trade name "Slenderella" in its business, a 
finding that operator's use of such name was in good faith 
and without design or intent to eapitalize on retailer's prior 
use of name is sustained by evidence that, before selecting 
name, defendant instituted a nationwide search to avoid use 
of a name that would infringe on rights of another person, 
that name was adopted after advice of counsel was obtained 
that no infringement would result, and that relatively small 
size of retailer's business and limited geographical area in 
which it is advertised and known, as eompared with that of 
operator of redueing salon and its affiliates, makes extremely 
unlikely the possibility that purpose of operator's use was to 
capitalize on retailer's business reputation. 
!d.-Unfair Competition-Injunctive Relief.-Injunctive relief 
against unfair use of a trade name may be obtained in situa-
Unfair Trade 
Trade Names and Unfair Com-
; Am.Jur., Trademarks, Trade Names and 
§ 86 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: 3, 4] Trademarks and Trade Names, 
~ 29; 6, 7] Trademarks and Trade Names, § 32; [ 5] Trademarks 
and Trade Names, § 33. 
